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Empirical research shows that nonviolent movements tend to be more effective 
than armed rebellion in influencing regime change, but in Burma (renamed Myanmar in 
1989), the people failed twice in overthrowing the military-controlled government. The 
1988 student-led movement had nationwide support and incapacitated the government 
but fell short of severing the military’s control of the state. In 2007, the monk-led Saffron 
Revolution attracted greater international attention but had less domestic participation 
and crumbled under violent suppression. Using Kurt Schock’s analytical framework for 
explaining the outcome of unarmed uprisings, which he describes in the 2005 Unarmed 
Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies, this thesis analyzes both 
movements in Burma/Myanmar in terms of their resilience and leverage. The 
comparative case studies of these failed movements show that they were unsuccessful 
because they lacked resilience due to fragmentation and a lack of leadership, and they 
lacked leverage due to the regime’s unity and its capacity to pursue an effective 
repressive strategy against the opposition. This study concludes that the regime’s 
unshakable solidarity was the main reason for the movements’ failure. Resilience is 
important for an unarmed uprising to amass support and build strength, but without 
leverage, its chance of succeeding is low. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In Burma, a 1988 student-led protest over the killing of unarmed students by the 
riot police metamorphosed into a pro-democracy movement. The nonviolent uprising 
seemed to be on the verge of overthrowing the authoritarian regime when the military-
backed leader, Ne Win, resigned and two subsequent regime-appointed leaders failed to 
end the nationwide demonstrations. For the Burmese citizens who harbored strong pent-
up frustrations, only a pro-democracy leader would satisfy their ultimatum; however, an 
indiscriminate spray of bullets killed their aspirations as the military retook control, 
ended the mass protests, and renamed the state Myanmar. Similarly, in 2007, a monk-led 
protest over the removal of fuel subsidies and the regime’s mistreatment of monks 
sparked another pro-democracy uprising, but again Myanmar’s nonviolent movement 
failed to topple the military dictatorship. Unlike these movements in Burma/Myanmar, 
unarmed national struggles elsewhere in Southeast Asia and throughout the world 
succeeded in overthrowing the authoritarian governments. Why did the nonviolent pro-
democracy movement fail in Burma in 1988 and then again in 2007? What prevented the 
unarmed protestors from ousting the authoritarian government? Have conditions changed 
in Myanmar since 2007 in ways that would increase the probability of success if another 
civilian uprising occurs? This thesis will conduct a comparative study of both failed 
attempts in order to understand the reasons for these failures. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Whether violent or nonviolent, the ousting of a dictator stirs intense emotions of 
relief and a belief in a better future. While armed and unarmed struggles have 
successfully overthrown dictatorships, a comparison of “323 nonviolent and violent 
resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006” reveals that unarmed uprisings are more 
effective than armed conflict in causing regime change, and the new populace-preferred 
 2 
leadership tends to be less repressive.1 Since nonviolent movements seem to be a potent 
force for political transformation, studying their outcomes will help identify conditions 
that led some to succeed and others to fail. In Burma, the 1988 nonviolent pro-democracy 
movement failed to overthrow the authoritarian regime as the military regained control, 
and almost two decades later, the military ended another civil uprising against the 
Burmese government.  
Understanding why the nonviolent pro-democracy movements in Burma/ 
Myanmar failed in 1988 and again in 2007 may help Burmese civil society and pro-
democracy leaders avoid making the same mistakes if and when another nonviolent 
popular uprising occurs. Additionally, states concerned with human rights may provide 
better support to Myanmar’s political opposition and the repressed population. Even 
states that are unconcerned with human rights violations, or simply prefer to avoid 
meddling in other states’ internal affairs, may have a vested economic interest to readjust 
their support for the authoritarian regime to encourage changes that decrease the chances 
of mass protests and political instability. 
Identifying the conditions that led to two failed nonviolent movements in 
Burma/Myanmar will be useful in analyzing the trajectory of unarmed uprisings that may 
occur again in Myanmar or in other non-democratic, military-dominated states. This 
thesis will add to the understanding of the outcomes of nonviolent movements in 
authoritarian states and contribute to the larger study on social movements. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The review of literature on nonviolent movements reveals that the outcome of an 
unarmed uprising depends on the strength and unity of the movement against a repressive 
authoritarian government. A non-resilient movement that is unable to gain enough 
leverage to undermine the authoritarian regime’s coercive power tends to fail. This 
review will focus on explanations for the failure of Burma’s 1988 nonviolent movement 
since little literature exists on the failure of the 2007 movement. I will briefly discuss the 
                                                
1 Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict,” International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 15. 
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emergence of the literature on nonviolent movements to explain why nonviolent action 
has attracted scholarly attention, and then review the literature on Burma to understand 
the failure of its unarmed uprising.  
1. Emergence of Nonviolent Movement Literature 
Nonviolent action is a high-risk approach for civil society to use in pressuring an 
authoritarian regime to change. Gene Sharp, who is considered by some to be the “father 
of nonviolent struggle,” defines nonviolent action as a “general technique of conducting 
protests, resistance, and intervention without physical violence … against determined 
opponents who are prepared to impose serious repression.”2 It takes a tremendous 
amount of courage to openly challenge a powerful, armed, and violence-prone opponent 
without weapons or fortification. Yet, nonviolent national struggles gained momentum in 
the latter part of the 20th century and continued into the 21st century as civil society 
“challenged dozens of non-democratic regimes throughout the world” with several 
succeeding.3 Some notable examples are the Philippines’ People Power revolution that 
overthrew a dictator in 1986 and South Africa’s struggle against apartheid that 
successfully ended in 1994. 
With an increase in nonviolent movements, especially ones that succeeded, came 
an increase in literature as scholars attempted to understand the emergence and efficacy 
of nonviolent action. Sharp’s comprehensive work on nonviolent action, The Politics of 
Nonviolent Action, written in the 1970s, became a highly referenced source by scholars 
and activists because it “provided a breakthrough in the social scientific analysis of 
nonviolent resistance.”4 For instance, his assertion that dissenters can cause political 
change through nonviolent action without reverting to armed conflict “despite the state’s 
superior coercive capacity” caught the attention of scholars, especially after the success 
                                                
2 Gene Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential 
(Boston: Porter Sargent, 2005), 547–48; Mairi Mackay, “Gene Sharp: A Dictator’s Worst Nightmare,” 
CNN, June 25, 2012. 
3 Kurt Schock, ”The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance,” Journal of Peace Research 50, 3 (2013): 
279. 
4 Kurt Schock, Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 38; Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter 
Sargent, 1973). 
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of some nonviolent movements.5 Charles Tilly, a renowned social movement theorist, 
began to recognize nonviolent action as a new repertoire of social movements, and 
Sydney Tarrow, another renowned theorist of social movements, expanded on Tilly’s 
work referring to the “modern repertoire of collective action” as a “newly found power in 
movement.”6 Tarrow states that disruption (nonviolent action) is the most potent form of 
a contentious act in social movements because it “gives weak actors leverage against 
powerful opponents.”7 While it may be powerful, some unarmed national struggles 
failed—as seen in Burma. With the increase in research on nonviolent movements came 
an understanding of how nonviolent action against an indomitable foe succeeds or fails. 
2. Literature Review on Burma 
As the literature on nonviolent movements increased, a small body of scholarly 
works emerged to explain the failure of Burma’s 1988 nonviolent movement. The case 
studies are a comparison of Burma with either successful or other unsuccessful unarmed 
uprisings or as a standalone assessment of its failure. The scholars provide different 
perspectives (movement-oriented, state-centered, or opposition-oriented), but they each 
conclude that the movement failed because it was weak against a strong unified state that 
used unrestrained violence. In this section, I will summarize the literature’s key findings 
on Burma. 
a. Leading Explanation 
Kurt Schock uses a movement-oriented approach to assess the success or failure 
of unarmed uprisings in six different authoritarian states, including Burma.8 According to 
Schock, a nonviolent movement’s success depends on its ability to remain resilient 
against repression in order to increase its chances of gaining leverage over a powerful 
opponent. He defines resilience as the “capacity of contentious actors to continue to 
                                                
5 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 38. 
6 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 7, 42. 
7 Ibid., 98. 
8 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections. 
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mobilize collective action despite the actions of opponents aimed at constraining or 
inhibiting their activities,” and leverage as the “ability of contentious actors to mobilize 
the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke pressure against them through the 
networks upon which opponents depend on their power.”9 For example, during the 
Philippines’ People Power movement, the anti-regime demonstrations lasted for almost 
three years despite Marcos’s attempts to end the challenge against his rule.10 By 
remaining resilient, the unarmed uprising severed Marcos’s sources of support until he 
lost the capacity to maintain his hold on power.11 In contrast, Burma’s 1988 unarmed 
protests withstood the dictatorship’s attacks for over two years but failed to undermine 
the regime’s sources of power to prevent the military assault that ended the nationwide 
demonstration.12 
Schock attributes Burma’s nonviolent movement’s failure to its inability to 
remain resilient against repression and gain leverage over the military regime. According 
to Schock, the disunity of the student and elite movement leaders caused the movement 
to become unsustainable because it delayed the creation of an umbrella organization that 
could coordinate and unify the nationwide protests, hindered the formation of a parallel 
government to replace the dictatorship once it collapsed, and impeded the emergence of a 
single movement leader. Furthermore, Schock argues that President Ne Win’s 
suppression of dissent and implementation of an isolationist foreign policy sheltered 
Burma against external threats and influence. He explains that without key political or 
military elite defections, autonomous third-party support, and effective international 
pressure, the movement was unable to gain leverage. Instead, the authoritarian state 
prevailed and reinstated its repressive political environment.13 
Schock’s assessment of nonviolent movements based on the criteria of resilience 
and leverage is useful in analyzing movement outcomes. His analytical framework helps 
                                                
9 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 142–43. 
10 Ibid., 68–79. 
11 Ibid., 84–90. 
12 Ibid., 98. 
13 Ibid., xxiv; 102–15. 
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assess the influence of repeated “interactions between challengers and opponents” and 
“interdependence of the polity and society in the national sphere and the interdependence 
of states and also nonstate actors in the transnational sphere” on a movement’s 
outcome.14 His study shows that movement leaders play a direct part in sustaining 
mobilization, but as for leverage, the leaders may have to depend on actors outside the 
movement to help weaken the regime. For example, without influential military officers 
willing to disobey the dictator’s orders to attack unarmed protestors, the movement will 
more than likely fail. Additionally, while the international community may choose to 
support the movement, its ability to tip the balance in favor of the demonstrators depends 
on the regime’s susceptibility to international influence. Unarmed uprisings are complex 
events and the numerous factors that cause failure are unique to each situation. This 
literature review will apply Schock’s criteria to the related literature on Burma’s 
nonviolent movement to test their usefulness as an analytical framework. 
b. Related Literature 
Other scholars who explain the success or failure of nonviolent movements do not 
use Schock’s terms of resilience and leverage, but the reasons they provide fall into one 
of those categories. Three other scholarly perspectives on Burma’s 1988 unarmed 
uprising identify the causes of the movement’s failure that are similar to Schock’s 
assessment. This section will review their findings. 
Vince Boudreau’s historical analysis of three pro-democracy movements in 
Southeast Asia using a state-centered approach provides insight into the influence that a 
state’s repressive strategy against dissent ultimately has on social movement outcomes.15 
In his study, he explains that upon assuming power, the authoritarian regime’s initial 
action against public challenges to its authority sets the precedent for subsequent protests. 
Knowing how the state authorities will react, activists will take advantage of emerging 
opportunities and work around or overcome constraints to mobilize support while the 
                                                
14 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 142–43. 
15 Vince Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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regime will “try to undermine or capture movement activities, discredit their lines of 
argument, interdict their connection to supporters, and eliminate opportunities for 
mobilization.”16 According to Boudreau, without the “connection between isolated, 
disgruntled, or concerned members of the ruling coalition and social reformers and 
activists,” a pro-democracy movement tends to fail.17 For example, in Burma, Ne Win 
“moved with swift and deadly violence against any open protest or dissent in the 
lowlands, driving resistance underground or to the country’s frontier-based insurgencies,” 
which kept the links between and among movement leaders and the public fragmented.18 
Additionally, by preempting dissent, he strengthened the unity and resolve of the ruling 
party, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), and decreased the likelihood of 
defections or loss of troop loyalty, which increased the regime’s ability to survive 
nationwide social unrest.19 In contrast, in the Philippines, Marcos’s oscillation between 
suppressing dissent to permitting dissent created an environment that allowed and 
strengthened the connections between internal and external oppositional forces that led to 
key defections that caused his downfall.20 
Boudreau attributes the failure of Burma’s pro-democracy movement to the 
effectiveness of the BSPP’s repressive strategy and the movement’s inability to erode the 
“state’s capacity for repression.”21 After the 1962 military coup, Ne Win eliminated civil 
society and kept activists fragmented, the public submissive, ex-regime members 
secluded, and the military loyal.22 He isolated the ruling party from domestic and 
international pressures and prevented “dissident discourse from gaining influence within 
the regime.”23 By doing so, the authoritarian government remained unified against the 
                                                
16 Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship, 1–2. 
17 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 35. 
18 Ibid., 4. 
19 Ibid., 12. 
20 Ibid., 9; 239. 
21 Ibid., 251. 
22 Ibid., 245. 
23 Ibid., 244. 
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intense pressure from the unarmed uprising, and the movement was unable to disarm the 
military and end the dictatorship. 
Despite having a different analytical perspective than Schock, Boudreau comes to 
the same conclusion that the movement was unable to undermine the regime.24 Applying 
Schock’s criteria to Boudreau’s assessment reveals that the regime’s actions had a greater 
impact on the movement’s leverage than its resilience. The BSPP played direct and 
indirect roles in hindering the movement from gaining an upper hand. Prior to the 
emergence of the nonviolent movement, Ne Win’s purges and suppression of dissent 
lessened the possibility of defections from the ruling party and minimized the impact of 
external pressures on it. Once the movement began, the ruling party used violence to 
force the populace to return to their homes, but the killing of unarmed civilians and 
beating of monks triggered mobilization instead of stifling it. Ironically, when the regime 
chose to do nothing and withdrew the security forces from the streets, the movement 
became increasingly fragmented, and when the military returned, it successfully 
subjugated the unarmed protestors. The dictatorship countered the movement’s resilience 
and maintained its leverage. 
Similar to Boudreau, Dan Slater takes a historical perspective in analyzing 
nonviolent movements and non-movements in seven Southeast Asian (SEA) states, but 
instead of a adopting a regime-centric view he focuses on society. In particular, he 
examines the evolution of communal elites and explains how the symbolic power of 
religion and nationalism influences movement mobilization and outcome. Slater defines 
communal elites as “society’s primary possessors of nationalist and religious authorities” 
who may have the ability to either sustain or undermine an authoritarian government 
depending on whether they are politically connected or autonomous.25 Slater found that 
when salient communal elites have sided with an authoritarian regime, “democratic 
protest has failed to emerge or has been suppressed with relative ease,” but when 
autonomous and salient communal elites supported activists, the symbolic power of 
                                                
24 Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship. 
25 Dan Slater, “Revolutions, Crackdowns, and Quiescence: Communal Elites and Democratic 
Mobilization in Southeast Asia,” American Journal of Sociology 115, no. 1 (July 2009): 203. 
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religion and nationalism helped mobilize and sustain the pro-democracy movement.26 For 
example, in the Philippines, instead of economic hardship and election grievances 
unifying the Filipinos against the regime, the symbolic power of the communal elites 
(Catholic Church and Corazon Aquino) appealed to Filipinos’ nationalist and religious 
sentiment to forge a common identity to overthrow Marcos.27 In contrast, Burma’s 
military weakened the symbolic power of the sangha, a community of Buddhist monks, 
that supported the movement by attacking the monks who participated in the protests 
against the regime. 
According to Slater, Burma’s pro-democracy movement failed because even 
though the activists and the regime both possessed nationalist symbolic power, the 
regime had greater coercive power to maintain its authority. Since taking control of the 
state in 1962, the Tatmadaw, the military, has asserted that as protectors of the state, it is 
the rightful ruler, but the university students have repeatedly challenged that right since 
Aung San, Burma’s revered national hero and military commander, was a student leader 
when he initially led the struggle for Burma’s independence.28 Slater explains that during 
every protest, students carried portraits of Aung San to emphasize their nationalist 
identity, and they have “often gained substantial societal support.”29 In the 1988 
nonviolent movement, the protesting students received additional symbolic power from 
the sangha, who incited religious sentiment by joining the protests, and from Aung San 
Suu Kyi, Aung San’s daughter, who inflamed nationalist sentiment by advocating for 
regime change.30 Nevertheless, the Tatmadaw’s entrenched belief with “its own 
nationalist purpose” to protect the state strengthened its solidarity, and it quelled the 
unarmed uprising without hesitation.31  
                                                
26 Slater, “Revolutions, Crackdowns, 220. 
27 Ibid., 206. 
28 Ibid., 241. 
29 Ibid., 242. 
30 Ibid., 244. 
31 Ibid., 240. 
 10 
Slater’s assessment of the communal elites’ weakness and the regime’s strength is 
similar to Boudreau and Schock’s analysis. The nationalist and religious communal elites 
had less influence in Burma than in the Philippines and other countries in the region. 
They had the power to mobilize an uprising and sustain it for a short time, but they were 
unable to weaken the authoritarian government or prevent the security forces from using 
force against them. The sangha was only partially autonomous in Burma since some 
monks depended on the state for alms while other monks depended on the populace. 
According to Boudreau, Ne Win’s attempt to control the sangha drove the activist monks 
underground.32 Schock explains that the monks lacked sufficient autonomy because Ne 
Win implemented rules requiring the registration of monks and ordered the removal of 
dissident monks.33 The students and Suu Kyi possessed nationalist symbolic power, but 
they had no connection to the regime to influence change. The communal elites in Burma 
contributed to the movement’s resilience but had little impact on leverage. As Slater 
contends and other scholars attest, the weakness of the communal elites and the swift use 
of force by the regime contributed to the movement’s lack of resiliency and leverage. 
Kyaw Yin Hlaing also takes an opposition-oriented approach and analyzes the 
influence of Burma’s civil society and social movement organizations (SMO) on the 
1988 pro-democracy movement. According to Hlaing, a movement tends to begin 
informally when an opportunity arises to mobilize collective action, but for the 
movement to persist, it requires formal organizations for effective coordination and 
informal connections for flexibility. Hlaing blames the weakness of Burma’s informal 
civil society groups for the failure of the nationwide protests and assigns fault to the 
bickering student leaders for hindering the emergence of an overall leader who was 
needed to unify the opposition groups and sustain the pressure against the authoritarian 
government. In a restrictive political environment, the informal network helped Burma’s 
activists take advantage of the public’s anger, use framing to mobilize society, and create 
SMOs for two nationwide anti-regime demonstrations; however, it was also the reason 
for the movement’s downfall. Hlaing explains that the secret and informal civil society 
                                                
32 Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship, 160. 
33 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections, 110. 
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that existed during Burma’s socialist era failed to effectively unite against the BSPP after 
mobilizing the public for the 1988 anti-regime movement. The mistrust and fighting over 
who would lead a coalition of SMOs among the informal civil society groups led to the 
breakdown of the movement as they lost control of the SMOs and the protestors. Once 
the military regime reasserted its power, it re-imposed the restrictive political climate and 
disbanded civil society organizations (CSO) to include previously permitted non-state 
controlled organizations and increased surveillance to wipe out any antigovernment 
activity.34 
Hlaing’s findings also fit within the categories of resilience or leverage as he 
identifies similar faults with the national struggle such as fragmented and disorganized 
student leaders that Schock and Boudreau describe in their assessments. Civil society’s 
strength lay in its ability to overcome constraints and mobilize a nationwide challenge 
against the regime. In contrast, its ability to gain leverage was weak. By being 
underground, it was unable to forge connections with former political elites and military 
officers who could have helped create a parallel government and choose a national leader. 
Additionally, by being informal and secret, it had a difficult time in lessening the mistrust 
among student groups and leaders. While civil society succeeded in mobilizing the 
challenge against the regime, it failed to gain the leverage it needed in order to overthrow 
the dictatorship. 
3. Summary 
The literature review reveals that various factors contributed to the resilience and 
leverage of Burma’s nonviolent movement, but it was the degradation of the movement’s 
resilience and the insurmountable challenge of gaining leverage that caused the 
movement to falter. Movement leaders and communal elites were effective in mobilizing 
people against the authoritarian government, but they were ineffective in sustaining the 
movement to overpower the regime. The student leaders were too fragmented to unify the 
nationwide protests, and the potential national level movement leaders (a former prime 
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minister, ousted generals, and Suu Kyi) had their own agendas that also contributed to the 
movement’s lack of unity. Since the monks were partially under state control, they were 
not immune from repression and were unable to influence regime defections and military 
desertions to help tip the balance of power towards the movement. International pressure 
or support was insignificant to have an impact on either the movement’s resilience or 
leverage. The regime’s repressive strategy proved to be effective in strengthening its 
solidarity and countering the national struggle against it. As the movement’s resilience 
decreased, its chances of gaining leverage and overthrowing the authoritarian government 
diminished. Using Schock’s criteria of resilience and leverage help operationalize the 
assessment of the movement outcome and capture the various causes of failure. This 
thesis will use his analytical framework to explain the failure of Myanmar’s 2007 pro-
democracy movement. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Despite the different perspectives provided and the varying reasons given in the 
literature on the failure of the 1988 nonviolent movement, the scholars reach the same 
conclusion that the movement was unable to gain the necessary strength to effect regime 
change and the authoritarian government was willing to use unrestrained force to prevent 
its downfall. Will the reasons be the same for the 2007 case? Considering the criteria of 
resilience and leverage, there are two possible hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: Fragmentation of the leadership—due to weak internal 
organization and regime repression—undermined the nonviolent 
movement’s resilience and led to its failure. 
• Hypothesis 2: High levels of regime unity deprived the opposition from 
gaining leverage and led to the movement’s failure. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
I will use the comparative case study method to study the failures of the 
nonviolent movements in Burma/Myanmar in 1988 and 2007. More than one nonviolent 
movement occurring in a country against the same regime is rare, so Burma/Myanmar’s 
failures offer an opportunity to assess a state during two different time periods under the 
same authoritarian regime. The sources for the thesis will be scholarly journals, non-
 13 
government organization reports, and newspaper articles. Additionally, I will review 
books on Burma/Myanmar’s pro-democracy movements. 
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II. BURMA’S 1988 NONVIOLENT MOVEMENT 
Burma’s 1988 nonviolent movement was the first nationwide protest against the 
military regime since it took power in 1962. University students successfully galvanized 
the population to unite against the government, and though the movement gained 
momentum and support, it failed to gain the strength needed to overthrow the 
dictatorship. President Ne Win effectively purged dissent from inside the ruling party and 
weakened the threat from external opposition. The movement leaders’ disunity that was 
caused by internal disorganization and government repression undermined the 
movement’s resilience while the regime’s unity deprived the opposition from gaining 
leverage and caused the unarmed uprising to fail. This chapter will give a brief history of 
the regime, the opposition groups, and their contentious interaction prior to the 1988 
nonviolent movement. Then it will recount the nationwide demonstration and analyze the 
resilience and leverage of the movement. 
A. PRE-1988 BACKGROUND OF THE REGIME AND ITS OPPOSITION 
After Burma’s independence from British colonial rule in 1948, its democratic 
government lasted for about fourteen years before the military stepped in and 
permanently took state power. The Tatmadaw, the military, perceived the civilian 
government, which was plagued with internal rivalry, as being inept in dealing with the 
threats from several armed insurgent groups and in maintaining stability and control of 
the state. To prevent further deterioration of the country, General Ne Win ousted Prime 
Minister U Nu in 1962, reestablished law and order, and proceeded to consolidate power 
and eliminate opposition. He took over the economy by nationalizing major industries, 
banks, and private enterprises. Additionally, he formed the ruling Burma Socialist 
Programme Party (BSPP), banned other parties, and placed universities, which were a 
historical source of political agitation, and the media under state control. Initially, the 
regime abolished the Buddha Sasana Council and severed the sangha’s political 
connection to the state, but as the monks continued to thwart Ne Win’s mandate to cease 
political activism and register with the state, he formed the National Sangha Mahanayak 
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Council in 1980 and established state authority over the sangha. Ne Win seemed to have 
implemented the necessary controls to stay in power.35 
Within the BSPP and Tatmadaw, Ne Win purged any dissent. When Brigadier 
General Aung Gyi, Ne Win’s trusted advisor and presumed successor, opposed the state’s 
new economic policy, the dictator dismissed him.36 He fired General Tin Oo, his defense 
minister, when the general disobeyed orders to suppress the 1974 funeral protest and he 
criticized the regime’s socialist economic policies.37 In 1976, when the secret police 
discovered an assassination attempt against Ne Win and other high-ranking party 
members, the dictator imprisoned Tin Oo and fourteen mid-career officers and executed 
Captain Ohn Kyaw Myint, who had planned the hit.38 Ne Win also purged Tin Oo’s 
supporters, expelled “more than 50,000 BSPP members and cadres,” deposed forty-two 
central committee members, and forced the retirement of several army officers.39 In 
1983, he imprisoned Brigadier General Tin U, his devoted intelligence chief who was 
“considered Ne Win’s heir apparent and…regarded as his adopted son,” and purged the 
Military Intelligence Service (MIS) because the agency and Tin U had allegedly grown 
too powerful.40 
Ne Win rotated army commanders through lucrative postings every six months, 
such as jobs in areas with jade mines and opium fields, to prevent officers from 
accumulating too much power and to also sustain their loyalty.41 He permitted troops to 
freely loot villages to compensate for their low salaries, and by allowing “corruption and 
brutality within the army every soldier became part of the system and inherited a vested 
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interest in maintaining the status quo.”42 In addition, soldiers received free housing, high-
quality education, the best health care, social mobility, and goods at below market rates.43 
To discourage defections, Ne Win had the MIS accumulate private information on 
military personnel, which “greatly contributed to the cohesiveness of Burma’s armed 
forces.”44 
1. The Military Regime and the International Community 
The regime’s policy of autarky helped decrease foreign influence. The 
demonetization of the kyat, Burma’s currency, led to the departure of foreign investors.45 
Because of a poorly performing economy, the dictatorship continued to accept 
international aid but only if it was government-to-government assistance.46 Ne Win 
ended foreign support from international non-government organizations (NGOs), such as 
the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation.47 He also closed the American and British 
language training centers and suspended the U.S. government’s Fulbright Scholarship 
Program.48 The BSPP severely restricted travel outside the state and limited visits by 
foreigners.49 It expelled foreign correspondents from Burma and barred foreign journalist 
from entering the country; however, it allowed foreign news agencies that hired state 
approved, local correspondents and operated under the strict guidance of the state to stay 
in Burma.50 To the detriment of the economy, the BSPP had successfully isolated the 
regime against foreign influence. 
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2. The Military Regime and Activists 
Once in charge, Ne Win created a climate that discouraged unsanctioned civil 
organizations. His 1964 National Solidarity Act outlawed civil society organizations 
(CSOs) and replaced them with state-controlled associations, such as the Worker’s 
Asiayone and Peasants’ Asiayone, and permitted apolitical and unthreatening social and 
religious organizations, like the Young Buddhist Association.51 The regime also had an 
“extensive network of neighborhood surveillance” and imprisoned “anyone criticizing the 
government or its policies.”52 Working within the restrictive political environment, 
students, teachers, lawyers, monks, and other professionals formed informal social groups 
disguising themselves as book clubs to avoid government surveillance and distributed 
anti-government pamphlets covertly while waiting for an opportunity to organize a mass 
demonstration.53 The groups met in “monasteries, private homes, and other secret 
locations, rarely holding two meetings consecutively in the same place.”54 While the 
secret groups thrived, the state’s prying eyes hindered them from coalescing into a larger 
and more effective CSO.55 
3. The Military Regime and Students 
After the coup d’état in 1962, the students continually challenged the military’s 
right to rule by leading, coordinating, or participating in anti-regime protests. Within a 
few months of Ne Win forcibly taking power, the students protested against the military 
takeover. In response, the security forces shot and killed several students, blew up the 
Student Union building (a “symbol of Burmese nationalism since the 1930s”) at Rangoon 
University (RU), and the regime closed down campuses for four months to deter further 
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unrest.56 Ne Win responded in a similar way to the 1974 oil field and railroad workers’ 
strike over low wages, poor working conditions, and food shortages.57 The military “fired 
indiscriminately on the workers” and killed twenty-eight and wounded eighty.58 The 
regime arrested university students who participated in the strike and closed down 
schools for several months. After the BSPP reopened the campuses, the students led 
protests against the regime for neglecting to hold a proper state-level funeral to honor U 
Thant, the former United Nations (UN) Secretary General whom the Burmese highly 
respected, when his body arrived home from New York.59 During the protests, they 
denounced military rule citing corruption, violation of civil liberties, and mismanagement 
of the economy.60 The security forces arrested and violently attacked the protesting 
students and monks, and Ne Win closed the schools once again to dampen unrest. 
The MIS attempted to curb political activism by placing “one spy on campus for 
every ten students,” but the students remained undeterred.61 In 1975, through their 
underground networks, the students secretly contacted laborers to coordinate a 
demonstration against the regime on the anniversary of the previous year’s strike.62 The 
security forces arrested 213 students and workers who had been camping out at the 
Shwedagon Pagoda a night before the anniversary march.63 Instead of being deterred, 
other students and workers marched to Insein prison demanding the release of their 
classmates and colleagues who were being interrogated and tortured.64 Upon their release 
from prison a few months later, some of the students began planning a demonstration for 
March 1976, but military intelligence agents discovered their plan and arrested about 130 
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students at RU.65 Each time an unarmed protest occurred, the regime successfully ended 
the unrest through arrests, violence, and campus closures. After 1976, a decade passed 
before another uprising occurred. 
During protests, leaders emerged spontaneously but they soon became targets of 
regime suppression. The students’ most experienced leader, Tin Maung Oo, surfaced 
during U Thant’s funeral protest, and the regime executed him and imprisoned his 
family.66 Since then, potential student leaders have avoided public attention as “state 
repression and informants drove all others to jail, exile, the grave, or underground.”67 In 
1988, the students successfully instigated a nationwide nonviolent movement through 
their underground network and student leaders emerged but most covered their faces 
initially with handkerchiefs but later removed them as the movement grew.68  
4. The Military Regime and Monks 
The military regime has had an antagonistic relationship with the sangha since the 
1962 coup d’état. After the military took power, Ne Win, preferring a secular state, 
eliminated state religious laws that supported Buddhism and ended government subsidies 
to the sangha; however, he still wanted control over the monks.69 When he attempted to 
make them register with the state, they refused to comply.70 In 1965, the security forces 
“arrested more than 100” of about 2,000 monks who protested against state control.71 As 
the sangha continued to challenge state authority, the regime dealt with the wayward 
monks violently. From 1970 to 1972, military troops, led by Sein Lwin, suppressed a 
group of militant monks, the Young Monks, in northern Burma.72 Then two years later, 
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security forces arrested and killed monks who were protesting with students over U 
Thant’s improper memorial service.73 The demonstration was the “first significant protest 
in ten years in which monks participated.”74 In 1978, the regime continued its attack 
against the sangha by imprisoning, torturing, or disrobing monks seen as violating their 
religious vows75 Fed up with the monks’ resistance, the BSPP officially implemented 
state control a few years later in an attempt to increase its authority over the sangha. 
In 1980, Ne Win appointed General Sein Lwin (who became known as the 
Butcher of Rangoon because of his indiscriminate use of violence against unarmed 
protestors) to convene the First Congregation of All Orders for the Purification, 
Perpetuation and Propagation of Sasana.76 Sein Lwin, with the assistance of “more than 
1,000 senior monks” formed a hierarchical organization for the sangha.77 They created 
the state-controlled Supreme Sangha Council, assigned retired military officers to handle 
the financial affairs of the abbeys, and established village, township, city, and district 
level government-appointed sangha councils.78 Ne Win held senior abbots responsible for 
controlling the behavior of their monks and preventing the monasteries from becoming 
“havens for political activist, as they had been so many times before in Burmese 
history.”79 Despite the intimidation, violent attacks, and imposition of state control, the 
regime and senior abbots have been unsuccessful in preventing the “country’s hundreds 
of thousands of monks” from joining the student-led 1988 nonviolent movement.80 
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5. The Military Regime and Internal Opposition 
Ousted political elites who opposed the authoritarian regime and joined the 1988 
pro-democracy movement were powerless against Ne Win. After fleeing to Thailand 
upon his release from prison in 1966, Former Prime Minister U Nu formed a 
government-in-exile to gain support from the international community in overthrowing 
the regime.81 The presence of MIS’ secret informers among the “politicized Burmese 
exiles” caused paranoia and mutual suspicions, which “neutralized [the exiles] as a 
political force.”82 When Ne Win offered amnesty to the political outcasts and prisoners in 
1980, U Nu returned to Burma because the financial support for his cause had 
dwindled.83 After his release from prison, former Defense Minister Tin Oo pursued a law 
degree and waited until the nonviolent movement in 1988 to oppose the regime.84 Ne 
Win’s former trusted advisor, Aung Gyi, whom the BSPP allowed to set up a tea and 
pastry franchise in Rangoon, began to write open letters to Ne Win in 1987 when he 
sensed the public’s growing anger.85 He warned the dictator about the dangers of 
mismanaging the economy and of attacking students, and he encouraged the regime to 
pursue reform.86 As the 1988 nonviolent movement gained momentum, he joined the 
other previously deposed political elites to support the public’s effort to end military rule. 
While Suu Kyi may have helped increase support for the nonviolent movement, 
her influence was limited since she had been out of the country most of her life. In 1960, 
she went to New Delhi with her mother, Khin Kyi, who was Burma’s ambassador to 
India. Her mother returned to Burma after the completion of her ambassadorship while 
Suu Kyi married and lived with her British husband in Bhutan, Britain, and other 
countries. While in Bhutan in the 1970s, she gained experience in politics by advising the 
state’s foreign affairs minister on UN matters. Suu Kyi periodically visited Khin Kyi in 
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Burma but then returned for a longer stay in 1988 to take care of her ailing mother. She 
had no intention of becoming involved in the nonviolent movement that had been gaining 
momentum throughout the country until she learned of the regime’s indiscriminate 
killings of unarmed protestors during a nationwide demonstration held in early August.87 
B. 1988 UPRISING: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
The 1988 nonviolent movement developed from heightened tension that arose in 
1987 between the regime and the public over demonetization of the kyat that wiped out 
people’s savings. The students rioted when they were unable to pay their tuition because 
of the devalued currency, and the BSPP responded by closing the universities for about 
two months. Nevertheless, tensions remained high across the country and sporadic unrest 
continued. Even Burmese exiles sensing potential unrest formed the Committee for 
Restoration of Democracy in Burma (CRDB) and waited on the Thai border for an 
uprising to occur. The Burmese people seemed to be united in their aim to topple the 
regime; however, they were disjointed.88 
In March 1988, Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT) students demanded justice 
after the police released the son of a highly connected local political authority after he 
was arrested for beating a university student. When the local officials ignored their 
ultimatums, student protests intensified until the riot police responded with brutal force 
that culminated in several students’ deaths. Realizing the students’ anger was unabated, 
the BSPP decided to take preemptive action and ordered the security forces to attack the 
RIT students to deter further unrest. Instead of suppressing the unrest, the violence 
increased student solidarity across Rangoon.89 
To show their support for the RIT students, the RU students peacefully marched 
to RIT shouting for democracy. Before reaching the RIT campus, the military and riot 
police surrounded the students near Inya Lake on the “White Bridge” and brutally beat 
the marchers and drowned a few in the lake as they tried to escape. When the attack was 
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over, bodies were taken away and fire trucks washed the bloodstained streets to remove 
any evidence of government assault. Nevertheless, the news of the violence spread 
increasing the public’s anger.90 
To help dampen the heightened emotions, the BSPP hired a commission to 
investigate the murder of the first student. The students viewed the gesture as a sign of 
weakness and a partial victory, and their determination increased to end the dictatorship. 
To improve their organization, the students developed a campus communication network 
with other schools and sought the advice of former students who had experience 
demonstrating against the government. Once again, the ruling party took the offensive 
and attacked RU, and once more, the assault increased the students’ resolve and sparked 
nationwide outrage.91 
As the interaction between the regime, security forces, and students increased, 
other sectors of society began to join the protest in March. Prior to the August 8 
nationwide general strike, the students’ demanded the government provide justice for the 
student shootings and reveal the truth about the killings. As the protest grew in 
momentum, their ultimatum shifted to replacing the BSPP with a democratic government, 
and they began shouting anti-regime slogans that attracted support from more and more 
people and transformed the protests into a pro-democracy movement. Monks, factory 
workers, disgruntled citizens with financial or other past grievances, and the unemployed 
joined the student protests, and the unrest began to grow outside of Rangoon.92 
Realizing the students’ steadfastness and the public’s undiminished anger, Ne 
Win resigned as president and party chairman in July and encouraged the BSPP to 
consider a multi-party system, which they rejected. Instead, they appointed General Sein 
Lwin, the Butcher of Rangoon, as president and chairman, which infuriated the populace. 
The underground groups expanded their informal networks they had previously built and 
used word of mouth, pamphlets, and BBC and Voice of America radio stations to 
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coordinate a nationwide protest for August 8. They convinced bar associations, 
monasteries, and other religious, community, and professional associations to become 
social movement organizations (SMOs) and also helped form about 200 local strike 
committees throughout the state. Ne Win’s resignation and radio broadcasts about 
international support for the movement encouraged previously reluctant citizens to join 
the anti-regime protests. On August 8, the different segments of society coalesced and 
held a nationwide strike. The military fired into protesting crowds killing between one 
thousand and three thousand demonstrators, but instead of ending the protests, sporadic 
and smaller sized demonstrations continued resulting in Sein Lwin resigning on August 
12. The party, seemingly attempting to placate the public, appointed a moderate civilian 
president, Dr. Maung Maung, but the unarmed protestors refused to accept the 
compromise.93 
Protests occurred in over forty locations throughout Burma with the involvement 
of thousands of people. Anti-regime supporters consisted of lawyers, writers, film actors, 
singers, and even some personnel from the civil service, the military, the police, and the 
ruling party. The demonstrators used barricades to impede movement of armed vehicles 
and troops. Lawyers, doctors, and nurses publicly condemned the regime’s violent 
actions, and the surviving members of the Thirty Comrades attempted to persuade 
soldiers to defect. Many people refused to work and defied the government-imposed 
curfew. Thousands of BSPP members quit the political party while several other people 
went on hunger strikes. As the demonstrations continue to grow, air and rail 
transportation came to a standstill.94 
Elite opposition began to speak out against decades of repression and economic 
mismanagement. Former Brigadier General Aung Gyi, who previously supported the 
regime, wrote open criticizing letters to Ne Win calling for economic and political 
reform.95 Several other elites, Suu Kyi, who had been in Burma to visit her ailing mother; 
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U Nu, the first prime minister of Burma that was ousted by a military coup; and Tin Oo, a 
former supporter of Ne Win until arrested for treason, joined the pro-democracy 
movement.96 The demonstrators believed that since Tin Oo was a former defense 
minister he would be able to convince officers to defect and persuade the military to 
switch its allegiance.97 Furthermore, the protestors viewed Suu Kyi as their beacon of 
hope against the repressive regime after they heard her first inspiring speech at 
Shwedagon Pagoda, which captured their hearts.98 The Burmese people’s deeply held 
respect for Suu Kyi originated from the memory of her father, Aung San.99 Suu Kyi 
became committed to freeing the Burmese people from oppression and disregarded the 
government’s travel ban and embarked on a cross-country tour calling for democracy and 
promoting nonviolence. 
Several organizations emerged as the anti-government protests persisted. In RU, 
the students built up an “intricate network of contacts throughout [its] four campuses.”100 
Advised by former protest-experienced students, they formed an information department, 
a social welfare department, an intelligence unit, and even a prison.101 The All Burma 
Federation of Students’ Unions (ABFSU) and the ABFSU Reorganizing Committee re-
surfaced after years of being underground, and the All-Burma Student’s Democratic 
Front (ABSDF) “emerged as a major student organization” consisting of eighteen groups 
after the August 8 mass uprising.102 To sustain the pressure on the regime, the students 
organized another general strike for August 22 that once again had nationwide support. 
By September, it seemed the regime had lost control. Hundreds of independent 
organizations made-up of different segments of the population formed throughout the 
country as the resignation of two leaders, Ne Win and later Sein Lwin, the lifting of 
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martial law, and the retreat of the military and riot police from the cities emboldened 
citizens to continue to press for change.103 Civil society seemed to be gaining control as 
the military withdrew and the regime appeared helpless. 
The sense of impending victory filled the atmosphere, but the division among the 
movement’s political elites and increasing violence within the movement replaced 
solidarity with a feeling of uncertainty and paranoia.104 U Nu, apparently seeing a chance 
to return to power, pressed movement leaders and the public to support his interim 
government with himself as the leader.105 He gained little support. Instead, Suu Kyi, 
Aung Gyi, and Tin Oo formed a political party, the National League for Democracy 
(NLD), and preferred to work within the current political system to change the regime. 
Moreover, rumors of government sabotage such as “poisoning the water supplies of the 
demonstrators and deliberately instigating unrest by sponsoring gangs of robbers” led to 
increasing violence.106 Protestors beheaded suspected saboteurs, destroyed government 
buildings, and other violent acts.107 Instead of maintaining the focus on ousting the 
regime, local strike committees and protesting monks became distracted with taking over 
local government functions, such as trash collection and traffic control.108 Burma 
appeared to be falling into chaos as law and order disintegrated, and the movement 
leaders were unable to maintain control of the various opposition groups or stymie the 
violence perpetrated by the demonstrators. On September 18, the military reemerged as 
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and forcibly restored law and 
order.  
The SLORC succeeded in ending the nationwide protests in October 1988. 
Majority of the SMOs, especially the ones that had developed for the movement, fearing 
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reprisal ceased their anti-government activity, while the regime arrested students and 
monks who continued to organize illegally. The politically active All-Burma Young 
Monk’s Association, that survived Ne Win’s rule, disbanded itself after the SLORC 
incarcerated its leaders, and some of the “ex-civil servants, politicians, writers, and 
intellectuals that took part in the demonstrations quickly dispersed, some fleeing 
overseas.”109 To deter further student protests, the military junta shut down the 
universities for three years, and many students fled to join the armed ethnic groups along 
the border.110 Additionally, the soldiers, who had names and photographs of several 
protest participants, raided local strike centers, monasteries, businesses, and private 
residences and arrested student activists, movement leaders, and military defectors. The 
SLORC coerced people to return to their homes and jobs and promised to convene a 
multi-party election in two years in an “effort to diffuse internal and external pressure, 
certify its rule, and receive foreign aid.”111 Suu Kyi and the NLD attempted to embark on 
election campaigns but the junta placed her under house arrest and imprisoned the other 
members.112 It seemed that little had changed in Burma even though the nonviolent 
movement had almost toppled the regime. 
C. THE FAILURE OF BURMA’S 1988 NONVIOLENT MOVEMENT 
Prior to the 1988 nonviolent movement, the regime was unified and the 
opposition unconnected. Ne Win had successfully insulated the regime from internal and 
external threats through purges, surveillance, repression, and economic isolation. The 
various opposition groups held periodic protests against the regime but they were small, 
short, and ineffective in influencing reform. Over the years, the university students 
gained experience in publicly challenging the regime, but the government’s constant 
surveillance and arrest of student leaders hindered their ability to build camaraderie with 
each other and solidarity with other oppositional groups or former political elites. The 
monks periodically joined student-led protests, but because of their antagonistic 
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relationship with the regime and the military, they had no influence in persuading the 
ruling party to reform or deterring the troops from attacking. U Nu, Tin Oo, Aung Gyi, 
and Suu Kyi had no meaningful connection with the students, other oppositional groups, 
or each other. After his government-in-exile faltered from a lack of funding and support, 
U Nu did not create another parallel government until the 1988 nonviolent movement. 
Tin Oo waited until the movement to openly oppose the regime, Aung Gyi began to 
criticize Ne Win a few months prior to the uprising, and Suu Kyi joined the 
demonstrations after it began. Prior to the start of the nonviolent movement, the odds of 
the opposition overthrowing the dictatorship were low. 
Crippling financial hardship, injustice, and repressed grievances led to the 
populace rising up against a powerful foe in 1988. Students, housewives, monks, young 
schoolchildren, and numerous others marched peacefully, went on hunger strikes, quit 
working, held demonstrations, and used other types of nonviolent methods to pressure the 
regime to change. Some protesters used violence, but the term nonviolent movement* 
does not necessarily “mean the absence of violence,” but it does refer to the main strategy 
used by the opposition to overthrow the government.113 As the nonviolent movement 
gained momentum and strength, local governments collapsed and transportation came to 
a standstill. It seemed the unarmed demonstrators would succeed in overthrowing the 
regime, but the movement leaders’ lost their focus. Instead of working together and 
uniting the movement, they worked separately and pursued their own agendas and caused 
the movement to fail. 
The fragmented leadership and the movement’s internal disorganization caused 
the uprising to fall into chaos and succumb to the Tatmadaw’s attack as it reinstituted law 
and order. The lack of solidarity among and within the opposition groups undermined 
their ability to take advantage of the three-week absence of the regime and security 
forces. Instead of uniting, the two underground student unions that emerged during the 
movement, ABFSU and the ABFSU Reorganizing Committee, rivaled each other.114 The 
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oppositional elites refused to support U Nu’s parallel government because they believed 
his concern lay with returning to power rather than achieving democracy, and they 
mistakenly assumed that the SLORC would honor election results. There was no 
alternative government to take over and bring the people together for another large-scale 
demonstration to solidify a new government authority. During BSPP’s absence, people 
were unsure if the regime members had fled and uncertain who was in charge. As 
ambiguity and confusion set in, law and order deteriorated and movement leaders lost 
control of the movement and any chance of gaining leverage over the regime. The 
military rulers had time to regroup and redeploy troops to end the pro-democracy 
movement. 
The BSPP’s repressive strategy and isolationist policy thwarted the movement’s 
ability to gain leverage. Ne Win’s purges strengthened the regime’s solidarity and 
solidified the military’s loyalty. During the heightened period of unrest, two regime 
leaders resigned but the ruling party remained intact. When the BSPP failed to end the 
nationwide protest, instead of collapsing, it simply turned over control to the Tatmadaw, 
which succeeded in violently suppressing the movement. In a predominantly Buddhist 
country, the Burmese sangha had little sway over the regime or the military because of its 
antagonistic interaction with the ruling party and the security forces since independence. 
The placement of the sangha under state control helped deepen the division of the monks 
into two factions—ones who supported the regime and others who opposed it. Suu Kyi 
had more of an influence than the monks in galvanizing support, and she “emerged as the 
leading voice for the opposition,” but her focus was on letting the people select Burma’s 
leader through elections instead of overthrowing the government.115 Several military and 
police personnel joined the movement, but because of their low rank, their defection had 
little effect on the unity of the armed forces. 
Furthermore, international pressures had no influence on the outcome of the 
nonviolent movement since it came after the SLORC regained control. The previously 
uninterested international community became concerned after learning about the violent 
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suppression of unarmed citizens fighting for democracy, the arrest of Suu Kyi, and the 
failure of the movement. The democratic nations condemned the regime’s actions, and 
“most donors suspended their assistance programs.”116 Nevertheless, while the West 
imposed sanctions, other states continued to support the junta. Thailand negotiated 
logging rights to Burma’s teak forests and Pakistan, Singapore, and China sold weapons 
to the Burmese military. Private foreign investments in fishing, oil exploration, tourism, 
and other industries provided SLORC with much-needed revenue.117 The military 
regime, which had survived self-imposed isolation since 1962, was immune to the 
international condemnation. The regime’s unwavering cohesion inhibited the opposition 
from gaining leverage while the movement’s fragmented leadership undermined the 
movement’s resiliency. Burma’s first nationwide nonviolent movement failed to cause 
regime change. 
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III. MYANMAR’S 2007 NONVIOLENT MOVEMENT 
Almost twenty-years passed before another nonviolent movement occurred in 
Burma, which the regime had renamed Myanmar in 1989. The 2007 monk-led Saffron 
Revolution emerged from smaller protests that had been led by students who criticized 
the military junta for removing fuel subsidies and, consequently, drastically decreasing 
the people’s purchasing power. Despite attracting significant support and international 
attention, the peaceful monk-led procession struggled to survive attacks by the security 
forces and the regime’s militia. The Saffron Revolution’s lack of leadership and the 
nonstop repression by the senior generals undermined the movement’s resilience, and the 
junta’s impenetrable solidarity prevented the opposition from gaining leverage and led to 
the movement’s failure. This chapter will describe the changes that occurred in the 
regime and opposition groups after the 1988 uprising, and their contentious interactions 
prior to the 2007 movement. Then it will detail the Saffron Revolution and analyze its 
resilience and leverage. 
A. PRE-2007 BACKGROUND OF THE REGIME AND ITS OPPOSITION 
After the military suppressed the 1988 pro-democracy movement, the State Law 
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) focused on preventing the occurrence of 
another large-scale anti-government protest and protecting the regime against internal and 
external threats. The ruling generals re-imposed laws and constraints targeted at curbing 
people’s pursuit of political or social change. They outlawed the assembly of five or more 
individuals and banned student-formed political parties and other politically oriented 
organizations.118 To prevent civil servants “from participating in future anti-regime 
demonstrations,” the junta replaced senior level civilian administrators with retired 
military officers.119 It also increased troop numbers “from 180,000 [personnel] in the late 
1980s to 300,000 by 1995, with the official aim being to reach 500,000 troops” for the 
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purpose of ending “any mass movement or armed ethnic resistance that might emerge in 
the future and ensur[ing] tighter control over government.”120 As an added precaution, 
the ruling generals constructed the new state capital in a secluded area 240 miles north of 
Rangoon and relocated “tens of thousands of public servants” from the old capital to the 
new one to physically isolate the regime from the populace.121 
After Chairman General Saw Maung suffered a mental breakdown in 1992, 
General Than Shwe stepped in as the SLORC leader and continued Ne Win’s strategy of 
purging disloyal regime members and military officers.122 After changing the junta’s 
name to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, he replaced 
“fourteen older SLORC members” and three other officials with younger military officers 
to “get rid of potential rivals and some of the more notoriously corrupt colleagues.”123 In 
2004, when Than Shwe perceived that Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, the former 
intelligence chief, had gained too much power and was acting too independently, he 
charged him with corruption and placed him under house arrest with a sentence of forty-
four years.124 Additionally, he imprisoned Khin Nyunt’s supporters and shut down the 
intelligence corps, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), which was loyal to Nyunt.125 
Than Shwe increased the frequency of reshuffling officers in senior level positions in the 
regime and the armed forces to “prevent the formation of internal factions and power 
bases.”126 His strategy seemed to work since another major purge did not occur while he 
remained in power.  
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The junta also used economic incentives and lucrative postings to buy allegiance 
and deter defection. It raised troop wages by forty-five percent and increased the defense 
budget “from less than 100 million in 1988 to close to $1 billion in 1994…which is twice 
its combined spending on education and health.”127 As a reward for loyalty, the regime 
placed regional commanders into “cabinet positions in the ministries.”128 Government 
officials and military officers received revenue from the operation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) and the sale of natural resources, which was $1.2 billion from 2006 to 
2007.129 The regime allocated “less than one percent” of the profit from the sale to public 
goods and services.130 Upon retirement, senior officials collected pensions from every 
government position that they had previously held and “received about thirty percent 
interest on their investments” in SOEs annually.131 After their death, their families 
continued to receive government support. For example, when former Secretary General 
Tin Oo died, the regime gave his wife and children a mansion and business 
concessions.132 In contrast, the consequences of disloyalty were imprisonment, exile, and 
the loss of access to state-controlled revenue. The regime also confiscated many of the 
person’s privately-owned businesses and nationalized them.133 In a poverty-stricken 
country, the regime officials and military officers had more of an incentive to remain 
loyal to Than Shwe than to side with the opposition. It was in their best interest to 
suppress dissent. 
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1. The Military Junta and the International Community 
With help from non-Western states, the ruling generals survived a failing 
economy and continued their repressive rule. Many Western states imposed sanctions on 
Myanmar for the indiscriminate violence used against the 1988 protesters, but they had 
little success in convincing the Burmese government to change its autocratic ways. “Most 
donors, including the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, suspended aid,” but 
China increased its support.134 American companies, such as PepsiCo and Eddie Bauer, 
shut down their operations, but Japanese firms, such as Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. and 
Daewoo, began business ventures with Myanmar.135 Between 1993 and 1997, “Japan 
provided $432.2 million in grants, $44.5 million in technical cooperation, and $75.36 
million in loans.”136 The regime welcomed the financial support but refused to be 
coerced into curbing its undemocratic behavior. Despite receiving a significant amount of 
assistance from Japan, the regime disregarded Tokyo’s warning that it would end 
development aid if the junta continued suppressing the opposition. In 1996, after 
attacking Suu Kyi’s motorcade during her cross-country democracy campaign, they 
returned her to house arrest without regard to a possible international backlash.137 The 
regime also ignored the annual United Nations (UN) resolutions calling for the “release 
of political prisoners and political dialogue with all stakeholders.”138 Sanctions and 
diplomatic pressures failed to weaken the authoritarian regime. Instead, with continued 
support from other countries, the “military government became stronger [and] its grip on 
political power tightened.”139 
The junta received most of its support from nations that wanted access to 
Myanmar’s valuable natural resources and its markets. In order to improve Myanmar’s 
dismal economy and the profitability of its SOEs, the regime ended its policy of 
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isolationism and opened the country to foreign aid, trade, and investment. While Western 
governments imposed sanctions, China and other Asian countries took advantage of this 
change in policy. For example, China assisted Myanmar in building up its military and 
supplied about $300 million in arms from 1992 to 1994 and signed a contract to provide 
an additional $1.2 billion of military equipment. Bilateral trade with China increased 
from $313.72 million in 1989 to $1.2 billion in 2005, and its ventures in energy and 
mining were worth about $194 million by 2005. China was Myanmar’s main diplomatic 
supporter but only its thirteenth largest investor. Singapore was the top provider at $1.1 
billion. Malaysia invested close to $446 million in 1996, which was three times larger 
than the previous year. Russia’s investments in Myanmar’s oil and gas industry equaled 
about $33 million in 2006, and Moscow received an oil exploration contract from the 
ruling generals for its veto of a 2007 UN resolution against the Burmese regime. During 
the Saffron Revolution, India pursued business deals and signed hydrocarbon exploration 
contracts with the SPDC while security forces violently suppressed protestors. With such 
strong support, the junta worried more about internal dissent than external censure, and 
supporting states cared more about access to Myanmar’s natural resources than the fate of 
Burmese citizens.140 
In order to limit the population’s exposure to foreign influence but to help meet 
people’s needs without spending state funds, the junta allowed certain international civil 
society organizations (CSOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to operate in 
Myanmar but confined their activities to nonthreatening projects. To meet the regime’s 
standards, the organizations had to be apolitical, hire from a government-approved list of 
employees, and take along a regime representative whenever they traveled in the 
country.141 In certain instances, the regime required international non-government 
organizations (NGOs) to channel their funds or supplies through the local military.142 By 
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2007, about fifty foreign NGOs and eleven UN-sponsored groups were in Myanmar to 
“meet community deprivation needs not addressed by the government.”143 The regime 
shut down or imposed additional restrictions on any group that appeared to be involved in 
anti-government activities. For example, when the International Red Cross (IRC) director 
openly criticized the government for human rights abuses, the SPDC made it nearly 
impossible for the IRC to function properly.144 Frustrated, the IRC closed down its 
offices. To ensure their programs endured, the remaining international NGOs and UN 
agencies in Myanmar focused on “health, education, HIV/AIDS, and agricultural” 
projects and kept away from politically contentious areas.145 The National League for 
Democracy (NLD) viewed the apolitical foreign organizations as being harmful rather 
than helpful because their activities helped legitimize the regime.146 By being apolitical 
and abiding by the rules of the state, the foreign civil society groups were more 
advantageous to the junta than the opposition. 
2. The Military Junta and Activists 
The ruling generals made it challenging for Burmese activists to assemble or 
organize in Myanmar. The SLORC shut down and outlawed CSOs and social movement 
organizations (SMOs) that emerged during the 1988 uprising; however, it allowed non-
political advocacy groups to operate but only under regime supervision. Since 
government accountants periodically checked the groups’ financial records, this intrusive 
act deterred local NGOs from seeking or accepting foreign donations, which was illegal, 
but did not dissuade people from forming new associations.147 By 2004, there were 
approximately 241,000 community, professional, “religious, parent-teacher, and social 
groups” in Myanmar.148 The SPDC shut down twenty-four that it suspected of 
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advocating regime change, and it forced the resignation of the Funeral Service Society’s 
chairman because of his involvement in anti-regime protests.149 
To help surveil the overwhelming number of civic groups, the regime formed its 
own CSO, the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA), which was a de facto 
civilian arm of the military and thus received state patronage. The hierarchical and 
pervasive USDA had “sixteen offices at the state and division level, fifty-seven at the 
district, 318 at the township, and 14,536 at the ward or village levels.”150 By providing 
preferential access to education, business opportunities, and government jobs, the USDA 
attracted numerous members from various parts of society.151 The association’s 
membership grew from over five million in 1995 to twenty-four million by 2007.152 In 
addition to monitoring civilian-formed CSOs, it harassed activists and organized pro-
government and anti-opposition rallies.153 The regime also formed a civilian militia, the 
Swan Arr Shin (Masters of Force), to assist the USDA in “prevent[ing] or suppress[ing] 
pro-democracy demonstrations.”154 Most of the CSOs wanted to avoid harassment or 
imprisonment, so they limited themselves to activities the regime perceived as 
nonthreatening and avoided political dissent. 
Furthermore, the junta made the lives of alleged activists difficult. It relocated 
citizens suspected of anti-regime activities outside of Rangoon, and with long commute 
times and the loss of support they had in their previous community, many of the 
displaced individuals’ “quality of life and incomes” decreased drastically.155 Other 
presumed democracy sympathizers experienced home raids by security forces, loss of 
their medical or law licenses, forcible closure of their businesses, or difficulty in getting 
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their children into school or the monkhood.156 The USDA and Swan Arr Shin harassed 
people who visited prominent activists in their homes “regardless of the purpose of their 
visit,” and some people who were taken into police custody disappeared.157 The regime, 
businesses, military, and their community treated released political prisoners and their 
families like pariahs. The former internees had a difficult time finding employment or 
running their own businesses because the regime placed employers who hired them 
“under more direct surveillance,” and the security forces hassled customers who shopped 
at businesses “of known activists.”158 Friends of a well-known activist, Aung Din, chose 
to avoid attending the funeral of Din’s father to avoid harassment and scrutiny by the 
USDA.159 The regime’s proactive efforts helped compel the public’s compliance and 
discourage defiance. 
As an additional measure to weaken the opposition, the junta limited the ability of 
activists to communicate with the public, international community, and opposition groups 
within and outside Myanmar. It maintained a tight control over digital communication 
and print media to minimize the activists’ capability to garner support, organize protests, 
and spread or publish anti-regime rhetoric. Additionally, it monitored Internet activity, 
blocked unauthorized websites, and restricted access to the Internet by charging an 
exorbitant $700 connection fee.160 With an average yearly income of only $435, the 
majority of Burmese citizens could not afford Internet access, a $1000 cell phone, or even 
a $75 SIM card.161 Nevertheless, despite the government’s control of print media, 
television broadcasts, the Internet, and cellular phones, it was unable to prevent foreign 
radio stations located outside of Myanmar from transmitting into the country. 
Underground activists risked arrest by smuggling evidence of regime oppression to 
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foreign broadcasters such as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, so the newscasters 
could transmit the information back into Myanmar.162 
With the restrictive political environment, most of the political CSOs developed 
outside of Myanmar to oppose the regime. According to Hlaing, forty groups “emerged 
in North America, Europe, and Asia.”163 The Free Burma Coalition (FBC), formed in the 
United States by a Burmese graduate student in 1995, successfully gained support from 
American students, universities, and cities and international human rights organizations. 
It played a significant role in pressuring the “United States and EU countries to impose 
economic sanctions” on Myanmar, persuading U.S. companies, such as PepsiCo and 
Eddie Bauer, to shut down their Burmese operations, and influencing “twenty-five 
American cities” to pass laws prohibiting dealings with U.S. businesses that had 
investments in the military-controlled state.164 While some of the pro-democracy groups, 
like the FBC, were successful in gaining foreign support, their influence inside Myanmar 
was minimal or nonexistent. By driving activists out of Myanmar, the regime was able to 
severe their connections to dissidents inside the country and sharply limit their influence. 
3. The Military Junta and Students 
After the mass demonstrations in 1988, the regime’s encroachment into the lives 
of university students became much more pervasive and disruptive as it attempted to 
deter student activism. In fact, the junta closed campuses entirely from 1988 to 1992 and 
increased surveillance against university students, especially those who had led or 
participated in the 1988 nonviolent movement. Military intelligence officers routinely 
checked on students and threatened teachers and hired student informers to report 
suspicious student activity.165 Students found it challenging to “organize underground 
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activities,” and some of them “gave up activism, while others continued with more 
caution” or operated in areas beyond the controls of the state.166 
Some of the students who had fled to the border areas to escape imprisonment 
after the 1988 movement formed the All Burma Student’s Democratic Front (ABSDF) to 
help expose the military regime’s human rights abuses. They worked with international 
NGOs, such Amnesty International and Asia Watch, in Thailand and in areas along the 
border that the ethnic minority groups controlled. Nevertheless, with the persistent 
infighting over leadership, violating human rights itself, and losing international donors, 
the ABSDF disbanded. The leaders from the ABSDF eventually learned to work together, 
formed a loose alliance, found new donors, and waited for the opportune time to act 
against the regime. Nonetheless, with increased government surveillance, a diminished 
number of political advocacy groups inside Myanmar, and tightly controlled 
communication, it was difficult for the group to mobilize or support an anti-regime 
movement since its links within the state were weak.167 
Despite the regime’s efforts to suppress dissent, it was unable to completely 
forestall student activism. To organize protests, students depended on word of mouth, 
flyers, and the underground network. In 1990, students held anti-regime protests to 
oppose the regime’s repudiation of that year’s general election results and to 
commemorate the 1988 movement. A year later, they led another protest calling for the 
release of Suu Kyi after she won the Nobel Peace Prize. Every time the students 
demonstrated, the regime reacted with its usual response of arrests and school closures. 
Frustrated with its inability to deter dissent, the junta decreased the academic year to six 
months to limit the time students spent with each other. Instead of curbing student 
activism, the shortening of the school year led to a large-scale student protest in 1996 
demanding a better educational system. The SLORC arrested over 100 students, and then 
closed schools for four years. The last anti-regime protest prior to 2007 occurred in 1998 
when universities opened for exams, and students gathered to show their support for the 
NLD that was attempting to convene a session of parliament with representatives elected 
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during the nulled 1990 elections. The security forces ended the demonstration by 
arresting the student protest leaders and sentencing them with excessive prison terms. 
The longest being over fifty years. In 2005, several of the student leaders of the 1988 
movement organized informally. To avoid arrests, the newly formed 88 Generation 
Students’ Group conducted low-key activities to oppose the regime such as petitions and 
letter writing campaigns.168 
The dictatorship implemented additional preemptive measures to end student 
activism. The junta broke-up universities and moved different departments to other 
locations to minimize the number of students congregating in one place.169 It split up 
engineering students by building a new technical institute for engineers in Mandalay, the 
Mandalay Institute of Technology (MIT), for the students of upper Burma, while the 
students in Rangoon attended Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT). From 2000 
onward, the engineering students had to attend three different schools to earn their 
degree. They spent the first two years at government technical universities, the second 
two years at technical colleges, and the last two years at MIT or RIT.170 Several 
universities were built in suburban areas, so the commute time for students increased, 
which decreased their free time available for networking or organizing.171 With the 
volatile nature of campus closures, over seventy percent of students took their courses 
online with the University of Distance Education.172 The breakup and relocation of 
universities and preference for online learning made it difficult for students to “recruit, 
build up organizations or organize demonstrations,” but they still remained undeterred in 
challenging state authority when an opportunity presented itself.173 
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4. The Military Junta and the Monks 
The SLORC attempted to increase its control over the sangha since preventive 
measures under the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) had failed to discourage 
the monks’ from participating in anti-government protests. The junta outlawed all sangha 
associations except for the state-controlled Union of Myanmar Sangha Organization.174 It 
imposed laws prohibiting the involvement of monks in politics, authorized punishment 
for disobedient monks, and prevented the sangha from performing religious ceremonies 
or building religious structures without government permission.175 Similar to Ne Win, 
Saw Maung and Than Shwe rewarded loyal monks with lavish gifts and titles and 
punished dissident ones with imprisonment or disrobement. After the 1988 crackdown on 
pro-democracy demonstrators and follow-on persecution, about “300 monks fled to the 
border with Thailand, joining an estimated 10,000 student refugees,” and numerous 
others went underground.176 Military intelligence increased its surveillance on the sangha 
and security forces raided monasteries suspected of harboring activists. Saw Maung 
justified the junta’s actions by claiming that “Buddhist scriptures and king’s law” gave 
them the right as “Buddhist rulers to invade and purify the domain of the Buddhist 
monks.”177  
Numerous monks continued to defy the regime and support student activists 
despite repeated warnings and attacks by the government. In 1990, approximately 20,000 
Buddhist monks and nuns imposed a religious boycott by refusing to accept alms from 
the regime and military after the security forces killed some of the monks protesting with 
students on the anniversary of the 1988 pro-democracy movement.178 The security forces 
responded to the boycott by beating, disrobing, imprisoning, and killing several monks 
and raiding “at least 130 monasteries in Mandalay alone.”179 The regime imprisoned 
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about 3,000 monks and sentenced Thu Mingala, a revered senior monk, to a prison term 
of eight years for his participation in the religious condemnation.180 The monks remained 
undeterred. Motivated by their “concern for the suffering of the people,” when the regime 
incarcerated most of the student leaders during the price hike protests in 2007, the monks 
took over and organized the second largest nonviolent movement against the regime since 
1988.181 
5. The Military Junta and Internal Opposition 
The military regime allowed the NLD to operate and maintain its status as a 
political party after the 1988 uprising, but the organization was unable to gain any power 
to influence reforms. Still believing changes could be made from within the government, 
the NLD participated in the 1990 general election along with several other parties. The 
junta, which was surprised that Suu Kyi’s party won around eighty percent of the 
parliamentary seats, nullified the votes and claimed the intent of the election was to select 
members for the National Convention to “draft a new constitution.”182 The regime’s 
actions angered the NLD, but the opposition party was powerless to force the SLORC to 
honor the election or implement government reforms. 
The junta kept the NLD weak by repeatedly harassing and arresting its members. 
Threatened by Suu Kyi’s popularity, the SLORC sentenced her to home confinement and 
imprisoned many of her NLD associates in 1989. In 1991, the SLORC incarcerated forty-
eight NLD officials for alleged treason, and five years later, it arrested 260 for 
participating in a student-led protest against police brutality.183 While Suu Kyi remained 
confined in her home, the NLD members “focused on maintaining the legal status of the 
party and were reluctant to engage in activism on the streets” because they feared 
arrest.184 Whenever they held meetings or gatherings, they stayed within the confines of 
their headquarters in Rangoon, which was heavily monitored by intelligence officers and 
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the only NLD office authorized by the government.185 The NLD had difficulty in raising 
funds for itself because accepting foreign donations was illegal, and the regime harassed 
domestic donors.186 In 1995, the ruling generals released Suu Kyi, but two years later, 
they returned her to house arrest because of her undiminished popularity and persistent 
campaigning for democracy.187 From 1989 to 2007, Suu Kyi had been in confinement for 
about thirteen years. The NLD had to operate without its most respected and popular 
founder and de facto leader, and it failed to make any progress in undermining the 
dictatorship. 
Each time the regime released Suu Kyi from house arrest, she enacted her own 
form of civil disobedience instead of organizing protests. She disobeyed the regime’s 
travel restrictions and made repeated attempted to travel outside of Rangoon to campaign 
for democracy. When the security forces stopped her, she sat in her vehicle for several 
days and nights to protest the regime’s restriction on her movements. Between 1998 and 
2000, she conducted three sit-ins ranging from five to 13 days.188 After she tried leaving 
Rangoon again in September 2000, the regime, fed-up with her noncompliance, returned 
her to house arrest. After being released in 2002, Suu Kyi and the NLD “embarked on a 
series of rallies around the country that drew crowds of tens of thousands of 
supporters.”189 In response, the USDA and Swan Arr Shin militia attempted to disrupt 
these pro-democracy assemblies. In 2003, they attacked Suu Kyi’s convoy, injuring her 
and killing about 100 of her supporters.190 Afterwards, the regime returned her to house 
arrest where she remained until 2010.191 In spite of being confined during the Saffron 
Revolution, she was able to galvanize support for the protesting monks. The regime’s 
fear of Suu Kyi’s popularity seemed to be well founded. 
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NLD’s lack of unity contributed to its powerlessness. Many of the party members 
were “former military officers, ex-bureaucrats, lawyers, journalists, activists, and 
students” with their own agendas.192 Aung Gyi, who had formed the NLD with Tin U 
and Suu Kyi, left the NLD “when former communists joined the party” against his 
objections.193 After the SLORC voided the 1990 election results, seven elected 
parliamentary members from the NLD left and formed the National Coalition 
Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), a parallel government, in the border area 
controlled by ethnic minority groups.194 Its focus was mainly on gaining international 
support than to “act as a parallel government within Burma.”195 The NCGUB moved its 
headquarters to Washington, DC, to lobby the U.S. government and maintain 
international attention on Myanmar’s human rights abuses. It still maintains offices in 
India and Thailand and pressures the “UN Security Council to impose sanctions” and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) governments to change their policy 
towards Myanmar and help bring democratic change.196 The current and former NLD 
members want regime change but they prefer to pursue their own strategy instead of 
compromising and working together to end authoritarian rule. 
B. 2007 UPRISING: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
The historical student-regime rivalry reappeared in August 2007 when the 
government’s removal of fuel subsidies increased diesel oil prices by 100 percent and 
natural gas by 500 percent, which devastated people’s purchasing power for basic needs. 
About 400 to 500 student activists from the 88 Generation Students’ Group started 
protesting SPDC’s sudden removal of fuel subsidies. The debilitating spike in 
transportation and food costs angered the Burmese citizens as it caught them unprepared 
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and caused them further impoverishment. The regime still carrying memories of the 
previous mass uprising quickly arrested most of the activist leaders such as Min Ko 
Naing who was one of the founders and leaders of the All Burma Federation of Students’ 
Unions (ABFSU). Separate protests led by other groups (NLD, Human Rights Defenders 
and Promoters, Myanmar Development Committee, and Labor Solidarity Organization) 
continued to occur, and the USDA and Swan Arr Shin militia responded by assaulting 
and arresting the protesters. With most of the protest leaders in jail or in hiding, the 
SPDC thought it had ended public dissent.197 
In early September, several hundred monks near the city of Mandalay, angered 
over the people’s inability to afford basic goods or to give alms, took over leading the 
protest against the government.198 The monks attempted to frame their demonstration as 
a religious rather than political protest in hopes of deterring attacks by the security forces, 
but the regime still reacted with violence. The Tatmadaw, USDA, and Swan Arr Shin 
militia responded by firing warning shots and “beating the monks and bystanders with 
bamboo sticks.”199 
The SPDC’s attack on the peacefully demonstrating monks angered the sangha. 
The monks demanded the regime apologize for its unprovoked assault on the monks, 
lower basic commodity prices, release prisoners arrested for opposing the regime, and 
discuss national reconciliation. Similar to its reaction to the students’ demands of 1988, 
the regime refused to meet the monks’ ultimatums. The infuriated monks formed the All 
Burma Monks Alliance (ABMA) and aligned with the 88 Generation Students’ Group to 
organize a nationwide protest.200  
The ABMA coordinated a religious boycott against the military through several 
monasteries throughout the country. During their marches in Rangoon, which began at 
Shwedagon Pagoda and ended at Sule Pagoda, the monks carried Buddhist flags, placed 
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their alms bowls upside down, and chanted the traditional prayer of Metta Sutta, which 
means loving-kindness.201 The overturned bowls and refusal to accept alms from the 
regime and military sent a strong message of disapproval to the ruling generals. 
Nevertheless, the religious boycott seemed to have little effect on the SPDC and 
Tatmadaw since they were still able to make merit with “government-allied Buddhist 
abbots and their monasteries.”202 Unperturbed, the junta allowed the marches and prayers 
at pagodas to continue while “plainclothes militia members and military intelligence 
officials openly photographed and videotaped the protest.”203 
Initially, the size of the monk-led demonstration was small, but it increased as 
people’s courage grew, and they decided to participate in the marches. For several days in 
mid-September, the sangha marched from the Shwedagon to Sule pagodas without 
interference from the USDA and Swan Arr Shin. Surprisingly, the police helped stop 
traffic for the procession of 300 to 800 monks while onlookers cheered from the 
sidewalks.204 When a group of monks marched to the incarcerated Suu Kyi on September 
22 and met her through the locked gates of her home, the moment reinvigorated the 
sangha and rekindled the public’s feelings of hope. A young monk recalls the emotions 
he felt when he first saw Suu Kyi, who had been confined for over a decade: “‘We got 
strength from her, and she got strength from us…. my tiredness from walking 
disappeared. We thought our efforts would be blessed, because we saw this person who 
sacrificed her life for all of us.’”205 At first the Burmese people were hesitant to 
participate but after witnessing the monks’ encounter with Suu Kyi, the number of 
protestors grew to about 20,000.206 To show their support, 150 NLD members marched 
with banners in the middle of the demonstrating monks, and ordinary citizens formed 
human chains around the marchers. The number of protestors ballooned to about 60,000 
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to 100,000 and spread to roughly twenty-five places throughout the country.207 
Celebrities, Buddhist nuns, and more students joined the protests, and the previously 
banned All Burma Buddhist Monks Union emerged to show its support.208 Within a 
matter of days, the monk-led protests became the second largest nonviolent movement 
against the military regime. 
Unlike its previous reaction to earlier protests, the SPDC seemed to be hesitant in 
forcibly ending the monk-led demonstrations, but when the number of protesters reached 
almost 150,000 people, the regime reacted quickly to prevent a repeat of 1988. The 
minister of religious affairs and the state-controlled Supreme Sangha Council criticized 
the protesting monks for their involvement in secular affairs and ordered them to desist 
their unsanctioned activity, and the SPDC warned the public against protesting.209 The 
next day the ABMA and the 88 Generation Students Group issued a joint statement 
encouraging the people to unite against the regime, and the SPDC responded by setting a 
curfew and reminding the populace that gatherings were against the law.210 As the 
regime realized that protests would continue regardless of its warnings, it mobilized 
troops and riot police to Rangoon and staged barb wired barricades at the Shwedagon and 
Sule pagodas and along the monks’ usual protest route. The police arrested the ABMA 
leader, U Gambira, and other prominent figures, such as the comedian Zargana, and had 
vans on standby to take away defiant monks who refused to stop protesting.211 The 
regime also shut down the Internet to prevent uploaded images, videos, and information 
of the protests and repression from being viewed domestically and internationally and 
“cut off the mobile phones of several journalists working for foreign media” to stop news 
about the demonstrations from getting out of the country.212 
                                                
207 “Crackdown: Repression,” 41. 
208 Fink, “Moment of the Monks,” 356; McCarthy, “Overturning the Alms,” 310. 
209 “Crackdown: Repression,” 43–44. 
210 Ibid., 44. 
211 Ibid., 45. 
212 Beatty, “Challenge and Survival,” 189–90. 
 51 
On September 26, the familiar violence-prone riot police and the army confronted 
the protestors. The security forces surrounded the monks who gathered at Shwedagon and 
attempted to load them into waiting army trucks. When the monks refused to end their 
protest, the riot police and army attacked. The onlooking crowd attempted to help the 
trapped monks, but the security forces responded with tear gas, smoke bombs, warning 
shots, and physical assault with bamboo sticks and batons. Protestors regrouped in other 
areas and attempted to continue the demonstrations, but at each place they congregated 
the riot police and army attacked them. Eventually, the troops began to fire into the 
crowd, but it still did not deter the protestors. The marchers attempted to appeal to the 
soldiers by holding up portraits of Aung San in hopes of reminding the troops that they 
are the people’s army and of dissuading them from attacking. Approximately 20,000 
protestors joined up again at Shwedagon and marched, without interference, to 
Botahtaung Pagoda.213 
The next day, the security forces raided monasteries and beat, disrobed, and 
incarcerated dissident monks, but protests continued. Soldiers and riot police blockaded 
the Shwedagon and Sule pagodas, so tens of thousands of people staged a sit-in near Sule 
and the offices of the UN and chanted for the army to stop killing civilians and monks. 
The familiar “saffron” colored robes were noticeably missing from the crowd as the 
regime had imprisoned most of the monks or confined them to their monasteries. The 
army gave the sitting protestors ten minutes to disperse before shooting warning shots in 
the air, launching tear gas, and then firing into the crowd. A Japanese reporter, Kenji 
Nagai, unintentionally filmed his own execution when a soldier walked up to him and 
shot him to death. The cities were inundated with soldiers, riot police, USDA, and Swan 
Arr Shin that dealt swiftly and violently with the protestors who were trying to regroup. 
With the loss of the movement leaders and the continuous encounter with security force 
violence, the popular uprising came to an end on September 29.214 
Upon seeing the graphic images of monks being beaten and disrobed, the 
international community condemned the junta’s actions against the unarmed protestors. 
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Various states encouraged a “peaceful dialogue between the SPDC and the civilian 
opposition.”215 ASEAN leaders criticized the SPDC’s use of brutality, and China, which 
had protected the Burmese government from UN pressure in the past, changed its stance 
and supported a trimmed down version of the UN Security Council’s presidential 
statement urging Myanmar to pursue a peaceful resolution and address the needs of its 
people.216 The majority of the western countries placed further restrictions on trade and 
on “financial transactions by [Myanmar’s] armed forces leadership, their families and 
close associates.”217 Tokyo once again suspended millions of dollars in aid. Nevertheless, 
the SPDC ignored the pressure from the international community and took action it felt 
was necessary to end the nonviolent movement and to preserve its rule. 
C. THE FAILURE OF MYANMAR’S 2007 NONVIOLENT MOVEMENT 
The junta’s repressive strategy after the 1988 nonviolent movement reinforced its 
unity and the military’s loyalty and kept the opposition weak and fragmented. The 
massive scale of the pro-democracy movement in 1988 caught the ruling generals by 
surprise, exposed their vulnerability, and showed them how powerful the Burmese people 
could be when they united against the regime. To help inhibit another similar nationwide 
protest from occurring, the SLORC and later the SPDC went beyond the usual tactics of 
repression to preempt anti-regime activities. The opposition groups and ordinary civilians 
desired regime change, but with the junta’s stringent laws, constant surveillance, 
communication restrictions, disruption of activists’ lives, and imprisonment of protest 
leaders, they were either unable to or chose not to coalesce. The 88 Generation student 
leaders periodically led protests, but most of their time was spent in prison. Other than 
the support of activist monks, the students were mainly on their own in organizing anti-
regime rallies, so very few demonstrations occurred between 1988 and 2007. Suu Kyi 
had the power to galvanize the population against the regime, but she spent thirteen out of 
eighteen years in confinement since her initial arrest in 1989. When she was freed from 
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house arrest, she chose to use personal civil disobedience and international attention to 
pressure the regime to change instead of leading a pro-democracy uprising. The CSOs 
outside of Myanmar also depended on Western states to help bring about change. With 
profit-seeking nations supporting the military leaders’ financially and diplomatically, the 
opposition groups’ use of the international community was an ineffective strategy. The 
Saffron Revolution had less of a chance to overthrow the regime than the nonviolent 
movement in 1988, because the junta had become too powerful and the opposition was 
unconnected and too weak. 
The severe economic hardship caused by the SPDC’s removal of fuel subsidies 
and the death of protesting monks led to another large-scale unarmed uprising against the 
junta in 2007. Monks, nuns, workers, mothers with children, NLD members, and banned 
opposition groups peacefully marched for several days calling for national reconciliation 
and the release of Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. As the Saffron Revolution grew 
in numbers, troops and the riot police teamed up with the USDA and the Swan Arr Shin 
to end the nonviolent movement. After each attack, the protesters attempted to regroup, 
but with the movement leaders in prison and most of the monks confined, they 
succumbed to the regime’s strategic and persistent repression and the Saffron Revolution 
ended with military rule intact. 
The regime’s violent tactics undermined the resilience of the Saffron Revolution. 
Various opposition groups that participated in the anti-regime demonstration depended on 
the monks to lead the challenge against the junta. Most of the banned political groups 
joined the nonviolent movement after the monk-led procession grew in size and 
proceeded without being attacked. Once the regime confined the monks, none of the 
opposition leaders stepped up to lead the protest. Since most of the 88 Generation student 
leaders were in jail, the movement lacked student leaders who could have taken over. 
Considering her actions during the 1988 movement, it is doubtful that Suu Kyi would 
have taken over the demonstrations if she had been freed from house arrest. Without the 
monks to lead the marches, the protestors, mainly ordinary civilians, attempted to appeal 
to the international community for help by gathering in “front of Traders Hotel, where 
 54 
several international agencies had offices.”218 The peaceful demonstrations lasted 
leaderless for about two days before the protestors yielded to regime repression. 
The short-lived nonviolent movement was unable to gain leverage over the 
powerful and united junta. Than Shwe’s repressive strategy towards his opponents 
combined with the provision of economic incentives to his supporters had effectively 
entrenched regime solidarity and military loyalty. His use of the USDA, Swan Arr Shin 
militia, and secret informers minimized the ability of the various opposition groups to 
gain strength, build rapport, or obtain external support. The NLD was powerless, 
especially without Suu Kyi, and some of the outlawed political groups, such as the All 
Burma Young Monks Union (ABYMU), waited until the protests grew in numbers before 
coming out of hiding. It is unknown if the government in exile, NCGUB, played a role in 
the nonviolent movement or not. The Saffron Revolution quickly gained momentum and 
was resilient for a few weeks, but its chance of attaining leverage was small. The junta’s 
response was strategic and organized, and the Tatmadaw and riot police attacked their 
opponents without hesitation to swiftly end the monk-led uprising. 
The media display of beaten and forcefully disrobed monks caused international 
outrage, but since the junta had strong support from several other countries, it was able to 
ignore the outcry calling for restraint, and it forcibly ended the protest. With the advent of 
new communications technology in Rangoon, the world was able to witness the generals’ 
violent suppression of peacefully marching monks as it occurred. Foreign journalists with 
their cell phones and activists in cyber cafes sent images of the nonviolent movement to 
overseas news media. The Western states, ASEAN, and even China urged the ruling 
generals to practice restraint, but short of invasion, little else could be done to stop the 
junta from attacking the protestors. Delhi “refrained from criticizing the regime’s 
crackdown” while its oil minister was in Myanmar during the monk-led movement 
completing business negotiations for natural resources.219 Despite the international 
attention, the help the Burmese citizens hoped for never came. The Saffron Revolution 
ended before it had a chance to evolve into a mass uprising capable of incapacitating the 
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state, gaining leverage, and overwhelming the regime. Without a unified opposition and 
national leader to help maintain the momentum, the movement lost its resilience, and 
with a military regime determined to stay in power, the ruling generals inhibited the 
movement’s expansion and never lost the upper hand. Another nonviolent movement had 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The 1988 and 2007 nonviolent movements in Burma/Myanmar attempted to oust 
the military rulers, but they ended in failure. Why were the unarmed uprisings 
unsuccessful? What hindered the protestors from overthrowing the military dictatorship? 
The literature review provided two possible answers for the failure of the 1988 
nationwide protest: Fragmented leadership caused by weak internal organization and 
regime repression undermined the movement’s resilience, and the regime’s entrenched 
unity prevented the opposition from gaining leverage. This thesis has presented evidence 
that supports both reasons given in the literature review. However, it has come to the 
conclusion that the leading explanation for the failure of both movements was that the 
regime was too strong and cohesive for the opposition to acquire enough leverage to end 
authoritarian rule. 
A. HYPOTHESIS 1: RESILIENCE  
The disunity of the opposition leaders weakened the resilience of the 1988 
nonviolent movement. The pro-democracy struggle showed that resilience combined with 
nationwide support proved to be a powerful force against the violent regime. The 
perseverance of an overwhelming number of protestors against repression helped 
incapacitate the state and shattered the perception of the regime’s invincibility. For three 
weeks, Burma was without a ruling party, but the movement was also devoid of an 
overall leader or alternative government that could have unified the protestors and used 
the power of the people to end authoritarian rule. Years of oppression had kept the 
opposition groups separate, which had diminished their ability to converge and make 
collective decisions. The divergent motives and plans surfaced during the movement, 
which had an adverse effect on the outcome. The movement’s resilience helped 
incapacitate the regime, but the fragmentation of its leadership prevented it from gaining 
leverage over the regime and caused the movement to fail. 
The lack of leadership also undermined the momentum of the Saffron Revolution 
in 2007. The regime’s incarceration of the opposition leaders prior to the start of the 
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movement, and the confinement of the leaders who emerged during the monk-led 
processions, proved to be an effective strategy in weakening the movement’s resilience. 
The magnitude of the public’s participation was insufficient to destabilize the state or 
cause the withdrawal of the security forces. The regime’s repressive tactics ended the 
Saffron Revolution before the protestors had a chance to gain leverage over the regime. 
B. HYPOTHESIS 2: LEVERAGE 
The strong unity of the regime during the 1988 and 2007 nonviolent movements 
enabled it to maintain its hold on power and suppress the opposition. Though the 
dictatorships were ineffective in preventing an unarmed uprising from occurring, they 
were effective in stopping the opposition from gaining leverage to overthrow the regime. 
The rapid escalation and massive scale of the first uprising caught the regime off guard 
and tested its solidarity, but the senior generals stayed united and quelled the unrest. For 
the second movement, the generals were well prepared to deal with the onslaught of 
protestors who threatened their authority, and they ended the Saffron Revolution before it 
became uncontrollable. In both cases, the authoritarian government was too powerful to 
overthrow.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the anti-regime protests failed because the highly unified regime 
prevented the opposition from gaining the leverage it required to end military rule. 
Fragmentation of the movement’s leadership weakened the 1988 uprising, but the 
opposition leaders’ inability to obtain leverage led to its failure. The powerful regime 
ended the 2007 Saffron Revolution before the opposition had a chance to gain any 
leverage. The 1988 pro-democracy struggles showed that resilience can incapacitate a 
state, but both protests demonstrated that without leverage the nonviolent movements 
failed. 
Since the end of the Saffron Revolution in 2007, Myanmar has changed 
politically, economically, and socially. While on its “Road Map to Discipline-Flourishing 
Democracy,” the junta has drafted a new constitution, transformed itself into a civilian 
government, and changed its name to the Union Solidarity and Development Party 
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(USDP). It has loosened its control on civil society and the media and allowed the 
privatization of several state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Additionally, it has opened up 
the government to the opposition, so that Suu Kyi, along with other members of the 
National League for Democracy (NLD), and several other parties, now hold some of the 
parliamentary seats. The USDP has lessened the country’s reliance on China. At the same 
time, it has increased economic and diplomatic engagements with the West, which has 
led to a decrease in international sanctions and an improvement in the Burmese 
economy.220 
While it seems a lot has changed in Myanmar, the military is still in control of the 
state and continues to rely on purges to discourage disloyalty. The constitution guarantees 
that the military receives twenty-five percent of the seats in parliament, which gives them 
veto power in the legislative branch. It also requires that a former military officer be 
selected either as head of state or as one of the two vice presidents.221 Additionally, it 
bars Suu Kyi from vying for the presidency. The USDP, which is fearful of her 
popularity, refuses to change the law to allow her to run for president in the 2015 
elections.222 Furthermore, the regime continues to purge disloyal members of the ruling 
party. In August 2015, when President Thein Sein perceived that Shwe Mann, “one of the 
three most powerful figures” in the Myanmar government, was forming ties with Suu Kyi 
and trying to reduce the military’s control of the state, he removed him as party 
chairman.223 Nevertheless, unlike past purges, in which the regime expelled a disloyal 
member completely, Shwe Mann continues to be speaker of the lower house of 
parliament and plans to run for president. Two other influential but disenfranchised 
USDP members, who have quit the party, also have presidential aspirations.224 As a 
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result, there may be a power struggle for the presidency, since Thein Sein wants to 
remain in that position. 
The Burmese populace, the NLD, and Western governments have high 
expectations for the November 2015 general elections, and some people are predicting 
that Suu Kyi’s party will win the majority of the votes.225 It is impossible to forecast the 
election results or the aftereffect, but if a nonviolent movement occurs to contest an 
unfavorable outcome, it may succeed in gaining leverage over the USDP. The main 
reason the military-led regime was able to survive the last two unarmed uprisings was 
because of its strong unity. Currently, the USDP is less cohesive than the previous ruling 
party and military junta had been. If the opposition unites, the majority of the population 
participates, and the nonviolent movement is resilient, it may finally gain the leverage it 
needs to break the cycle of movement failures in Myanmar. Social movements are 
complex events, and when they occur, the results are often surprising and the factors of 
success vary, but resilience and leverage play an important part in the outcome. 
                                                
225 Tim Hume, “November Date Set For Landmark Myanmar Elections: What’s at Stake?” CNN 
(12 July 2015). 
 61 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Alamgir, Jalal. “Against the Current: The Survival of Authoritarianism in Burma.” 
Pacific Affairs 70, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 333–350. doi: 10.2307/2761026. 
Alternative Asean Network on Burma. “Daw Suu Watch: Formative Years and Political 
Beginnings.” Accessed September 26, 2015. 
http://www.altsean.org/Research/DASSK/Biography.php. 
Aung-Thwin, Michael, and Maitrii Aung-Thwin. A History of Myanmar Since Ancient 
Times: Traditions and Transformations. London: Reaktion Books, 2012. 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10660913&ppg=1. 
BBC News. “Burma Junta Support Group USDA Disbands.” July 15, 2010. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-10651760. 
Beatty, Linnea M. “Challenge and Survival: Political Resistance in Authoritarian 
Burma.” PhD diss., George Washington University, 2011. 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1081861495?accountid=127
02. 
———. “Democracy Activism and Assistance in Burma: Sites of Resistance.” 
International Journal 65, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 619–636. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25762021. 
Boudreau, Vincent. Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Campbell, Charlie. “Burmese President Removes Party Chief in Major Purges Before 
Landmark Elections.” Time, August 13, 2015. http://time.com/3995708/burma-
myanmar-shwe-mann-thein-sein-purge-elections-southeast-asia. 
Economist. “Myanmar...Formerly Known as SLORC.” November 20, 1997. 
http://www.economist.com/node/106254. 
Fink, Christina. “The Moment of the Monks: Burma, 2007.” In Civil Resistance and 
Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the 
Present. Edited by Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, 354–370. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/reader.action?docID=10353927&ppg=377. 
Fuller, Thomas. “Myanmar’s Military Uses Political Force to Block Constitutional 




Hlaing, Kyaw Yin. “Burma: Civil Society Skirting Regime Rules.” In Civil Society and 
Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space. Edited 
by Muthiah Alagappa. 390–91. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004. 
———. “Setting the Rules for Survival: Why the Burmese Military Regime Survives in 
an Age of Democratization.” Pacific Review 22, no. 3 (July 2009): 271–291. doi: 
10.1080/09512740903068347. 
———. The State of the Pro-Democracy Movement in Authoritarian Burma. 
Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2007. 
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/EWCWwp011.pdf. 
Human Rights Watch. “Crackdown: Repression of the 2007 Popular Protests in Burma.” 
Report 19, no. 18 (December 6, 2007). 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/burma1207/burma1207web.pdf.  
Human Rights Watch. “The Resistance of the Monks: Buddhism and Activism in 
Burma.” September 22, 2009. 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burmamonks0909webwcover.pdf. 
Hume, Tim. “November Date Set For Landmark Myanmar Elections: What’s at Stake?” 
CNN, July 12, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/09/asia/myanmar-elections-
date-set-qa. 
International Crisis Group. “Myanmar’s Electoral Landscape.” Asia Report 266 (April 
28, 2015). http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-
myanmar/266-myanmar-s-electoral-landscape.pdf. 
Kurzman, Charles. “Organizational Opportunity and Social Movement Mobilization: A 
Comparative Analysis of Four Religious Movements.” Mobilization: An 
International Journal 3, no. 1 (1998): 23–49. 
Lintner, Bertil. Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy. London: White Lotus, 1990. 
Mackay, Mairi. “Gene Sharp: A Dictator’s Worst Nightmare.” CNN, June 25, 2012. 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/23/world/gene-sharp-revolutionary. 
Matthews, Bruce. “Buddhism under a Military Regime: The Iron Heel in Burma.” Asian 
Survey 33, no. 4 (April 1993): 408–423. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645106. 
McCarthy, Stephen. “Overturning the Alms Bowl: The Price of Survival and the 
Consequences for Political Legitimacy in Burma.” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 62, no. 3 (August 2008): 298–314. doi: 
10.1080/10357710802286767. 
 63 
Min, Win. “Burma: A Historic Force, Forcefully Met.” In Student Activism in Asia: 
Between Protest and Powerlessness. Edited by Meredith L. Weiss and Edward 
Aspinall, 181–204. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012. 
———. “Under an Iron Heel: Civil-Military Relations in Burma/Myanmar.” In 
Democracy Under Stress: Civil-Military Relations in South and Southeast Asia. 
Edited by Paul Chambers and Aurel Croissant, 102–125. Bangkok: Institute of 
Security & International Studies, 2010. 
Myoe, Maung Aung. “Sino-Myanmar Economic Relations Since 1988.” Asia Research 
Institute. Working Paper 86. National University of Singapore, April 2007. 
http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/wps/wps07_086.pdf. 
Nyein, Susanne Prager. “Expanding Military, Shrinking Citizenry and the New 
Constitution in Burma.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 39, no. 4 (2009): 638–
648. doi: 10.1080/00472330903076966. 
Ott, Marvin C. “From Isolation to Relevance: Policy Considerations.” In Burma: 
Prospects for a Democratic Future. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg, 69–83. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998. 
Schock, Kurt. ”The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance.” Journal of Peace Research 
50, 3 (2013): 277–290. 
———. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. 
Selth, Andrew. “The Armed Forces and Military Rule in Burma.” In Burma: Prospects 
for a Democratic Future. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg, 87–108. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1998. 
———. “Burma’s ‘Saffron Revolution’ and the Limits of International Influence.” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 3 (2008): 281–297. doi: 
10.1080/10357710802286742. 
Sharp, Gene. The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973. 
———. Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential. 
Boston: Porter Sargent, 2005. 
Shen, Simon, and Paul Chi-yuen Chan. “Failure of the Saffron Revolution and 
Aftermath: Revisiting the Transitologist Assumption.” Journal of Comparative 
Asian Development 9, no. 1 (May 2010): 31–57. doi: 
10.1080/15339114.2010.482798. 
 64 
Silverstein, Josef. “The Evolution and Salience of Burma’s National Political Culture.” In 
Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future. Edited by Robert I. Rotberg, 11–32. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998. 
Slater, Dan. “Revolutions, Crackdowns, and Quiescence: Communal Elites and 
Democratic Mobilization in Southeast Asia.” American Journal of Sociology 115, 
no. 1 (July 2009): 203–54. 
Soh, Byungkuk. “The Crisis of 1988 in Myanmar: A Watershed in the History of 
Myanmar-American Relations.” International Area Studies Review 11, no. 2 
(September 2008): 365–86. doi: 10.1177/223386590801100218. 
Steinberg, David I. The Future of Burma: Crisis and Choice in Myanmar. Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1990. 
———. Burma: The State of Myanmar. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2001. 
Stephan, Maria J., and Erica Chenoweth. “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic 
Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.” International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 
7–44. 
Tarrow, Sidney. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Thawnghmung, Ardeth Maung, and Maung Aung Myoe. “Myanmar in 2007: A Turning 
Point in the ‘Roadmap’?” Asian Survey 48, no. 1 (January/February, 2008): 13–
19. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2008.48.1.13. 
Thomas Jr., Robert. “Saw Maung Is Dead at 68: Led a Brutal Burmese Coup.” New York 
Times, July 27, 1997. http://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/27/world/saw-maung-is-
dead-at-68-led-a-brutal-burmese-coup.html. 
Thompson, Mark R. “Female Leadership of Democratic Transitions in Asia.” Pacific 
Affairs 75, no. 4 (Winter, 2002): 535–555. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4127345. 
Turnell, Sean. “The Rape of Burma: Where Did the Wealth Go?” Japan Times, May 2, 
2008. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2008/05/02/commentary/world-
commentary/the-rape-of-burma-where-did-the-wealth-go/#.VgSL_nt4hyo. 
Xu, Beina. “Understanding Myanmar.” Council on Foreign Relations CFR 
Backgrounders. Last modified June 12, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/human-
rights/understanding-myanmar/p14385. 
 65 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
